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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
CONTRACTS-RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS-RESTRAINT OF TRADE.
-This was a suit for an injunction brought by the lessor of certain
premises against the lessee to enforce restrictive covenants contained
in the lease. The covenants were made for the benefit of a third
party, a supply company, which had joined as party plaintiff. By
the terms of the lease the defendant agreed not to enter into com-
petition with the business of the supply company. Held, where re-
strictive covenants of a lease require the lessee to abstain from carry-
ing on a business within a given radius of the demised premises, and
neither the lessor nor beneficiary of the covenant owned any capital
stock of the other, and their relationship consisted merely in having
several common stockholders, the covenant was unenforceable as to
any area extraneous to the demised premises, but enforceable by the
lessor as to the premises themselves. Irving Investment Corpora-
tion v. Gordon, - N. J. Eq. -, 66 A. 2d 54 (1949).
Although at common law all agreements in general restraint of
trade were void on the ground that they were contrary to public
policy,' the tendency of recent decisions is marked in the direction
of relaxing such a doctrine 2 and gauging the validity of the con-
tracts by the reasonableness of the restraint imposed as necessary to
the protection of the covenantee and as compatible with the public
interest.3 Illustrative of this point is the leading case of United
States v. Addyston Pipe and Supply Company,4 wherein the court
declared that the main purpose of the contract is the criterion by
which the extent of the restraint (its reasonableness) is to be meas-
ured. This test of reasonableness extends not only to the exigency
of the peculiar facts under consideration but must also be related
to some other lawful transaction in the sense that it must be perti-
nently ancillary to that agreement and reasonably required as a -pro-
tective measure for the covenantee.5 Moreover, the courts, in apply-
ing this test of reasonableness, determine the territorial scope of its
effectiveness by the extent of the covenantor's business.6
Five categories of covenants in partial restraint of trade have
generally been upheld as valid. These are agreements (1) by the
seller of property or of a business not to compete with the buyer in
such a way as to derogate from the value of the property or business
sold; 7 (2) by a retiring partner not to compete with the firm; 8
I Mitchel v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wins. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Ch. 1711).
2 Tode v. Gross, 127 N. Y. 480, 28 N. E. 469 (1891) ; Hodge v. Sloan,
107 N. Y. 244. 17 N. E. 335 (1887); Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber, 106
N. Y. 473, 13 N. E. 419 (1887).
3 Automobile Club v. Zubrin, 127 N. J. Eq. 202, 12 A. 2d 369 (1940).
485 Fed. 271 (C. C. A. 6th 1898), modified, 175 U. S. 211 (1899).
5 Ibid.
6 Trenton Potteries Co. v. Oliphant, 58 N. J. Eq. 507, 43 Atl. 723 (1899).
See Note, 78 A. L. R. 1038 (1932).
7 Fowle v. Parke, 131 U. S. 88 (1889); Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber,
supra note 2.
8 Tallis v. Tallis, 1 El. & BI. 391, 118 Eng. Rep. 482 (Q. B. 1853).
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(3) by a partner not to do anything to interfere, by competition or
otherwise, with the business of the firm; 9 (4) by the buyer of prop-
erty not to use the same in competition with the business retained
by the seller; 10 and (5) by an agent, assistant, or servant not to
compete with his master or employer after the expiration of his time
of service 1 However, these categories will be upheld only when
they conform to the tests stated above.12
The covenant now under discussion is to be tested, then, on the
basis of whether or not it is only such as is necessary to afford a
fair protection to the interest of the party in whose favor it is given,
and not so large as to interfere with the interests of the public.13
The manifest purpose of the lease under discussion is to transfer
possession to the tenant and rent to the lessor. Was this purpose
protected by the covenant which was to restrain the defendant from
competing with the Newark Company? The proposition is self-
explanatory. The intended beneficiary was not the lessor, but the
co-plaintiff who had no such interest in the contract as would merit
the exaction of this restrictive clause-no pertinent interest, property
or otherwise, which demanded safeguarding.
J. J. F.
CRIMINAL LAW-ABORTION-WOMAN NOT PREGNANT IN LAW
UNTIL CHILD HAS QUICKENED. - The defendant was convicted
under a North Carolina statute' which makes it unlawful for any
person to administer drugs to a woman "either pregnant or quick
with child... with intent thereby to destroy such child." The com-
plainant's testimony indicated that she was made pregnant by the
defendant on June 14, 1948; and that the defendant, when informed
of the pregnancy, purchased medicine and took her to a doctor for
injections in order to destroy her unborn child. She also testified
that she did not feel the movement of the child within her body until
after August 25, the date of the indictment. The defendant based
his appeal on the fact that the complainant was not quick with child,
and therefore had not advanced to the required stage of pregnancy,
within the meaning of the statute, at the time of his allegedly crim-
inal acts. Held, judgment reversed. If pregnancy has not advanced
sufficiently so that there is a living child, that is, a quick child, then
9 Matthews v. Associated Press, 136 N. Y. 333, 32 N. E. 981 (1893).
20 Hodge v. Sloan, supra note 2; Dunlop v. Gregory, 10 N. Y. 241 (1851).
12 Herreshoff v. Bontineau, 17 R. I. 3, 19 Ati. 712 (1890).
'
12 United States v. Addyston Pipe and Supply Co.. supra note 4.
13 Fowle v. Parke, supra note 7; Gibbs v. Gas Company, 130 U. S. 393
(1889) ; Taylor Iron Co. v. Nichols, 73 N. J. Eq. 684, 69 AtL. 186 (1908).
1 N. C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-44 (1943).
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